First developed by the sixteenth-century Spanish Jesuit Luis de Molina, Molinism was accidentally reinvented by Alvin Plantinga in the 1970s, when he unwittingly presupposed it in his Free Will Defense against the logical version of the problem of evil. Molinism is a proposed solution to the age-old problem of reconciling human freedom and divine sovereignty. Its distinguishing claim is that, logically prior to deciding which world to actualize, God knows what any possible person would freely choose in any possible (appropriately specified) situation in which He might place them. Dressed up in more distinctly Molinist terminology, the claim is that God has so-called “middle knowledge,” by which he knows the truth-values of
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (hereafter ccfs), which take the form “If person P were in circumstances C, P would freely do X.” By means of this special sort of knowledge, God providentially plans out all the events of history in detail, without any abridgement of human freedom.
Since its reintroduction into contemporary philosophical theology, Molinism has been enthusiastically applied to a wide range of theological problems. In addition to issues of divine sovereignty, predestination, and foreknowledge, as well as Plantinga’s application of the concept to the problem of evil, Molinism has been applied to issues of prayer, prophecy, the incarnation, papal infallibility, the inspiration of Scripture, Christian exclusivism, the perseverance of the saints, evolution, original sin, the demographics of theistic belief, divine hiddenness, sinlessness in heaven, and more. But despite the apparent fruitfulness of the idea, Molinism has formidable critics as well. Ken Perszyk’s volume
Molinism: The Contemporary Debate provides a snapshot of the current state of what Perszyk calls “the Molinism Wars.”
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